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I. Introduction 
 
In line with changes brought forth by the rapidly globalizing world economy, the 
Korean government has recently pursued an FDI policy regime very different from that of the 
previous „compressed industrialization‟ era. At the outset of industrialization, Korea 
emphasized the promotion of absorptive capacity as well as the indigenization of foreign 
technology through reverse engineering, while restricting both FDI and foreign licensing 
(Ahn, 2001a). As a result, Korean firms were able to assimilate imported embodied 
technology so rapidly that they managed to achieve subsequent expansion while upgrading 
industrial structure to emerge as global brands like Samsung, Hyundai, and LG from an 
agrarian economy in just three decades.  
 
 After the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98, Korea was forced to pursue FDI-friendly 
policy initiatives in order to fulfill the conditionality of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in exchange for standby credit. In the past decade, policy makers in Korea have striven 
to devise a new FDI policy regime appropriate to the age of globalization and acclimated to 
the global economy by welcoming greenfield investment and M&As to augment investment 
activities which has thus lead to the development of a more competitive economy. 
 
This has meant dramatically shifting policy direction from conventional loan-based 
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borrowing to an FDI-based development strategy. In the interest of doing so, the need to 
establish a system capable of inducing new FDI and providing effective aftercare services to 
resolve the problems faced by foreign-invested companies in Korea has been fully recognized. 
Indeed, Korea has been very active in attracting foreign investment by setting up 
comprehensive service institutions to provide one-stop services.
1
  
 
In terms of trade policy, Korea has also recently changed its focus on the WTO 
multilateral process to regional trade arrangements. In this context, most Koreans now view 
the recently concluded KOREA-US FTA and other multi-track FTA initiatives as an offensive 
tool to upgrade not only Korea‟s socio-economic system but also to implement proactive FDI 
measures. At this point in time, there appear to be great challenges and tasks ahead for Korea 
to become an advanced open economy, the pursuit of which has been envisaged as a national 
priority objective by the newly inaugurated Lee Myung-bak administration. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to review several special features of Korea‟s FDI policy 
from a historical perspective and to discuss new proactive policy measures to induce FDI 
under the new government in the middle of Korea‟s ongoing multi-track FTA initiatives to 
upgrade the country‟s competitiveness. Section II describes Korea‟s FDI inducement policy 
and subsequent performance in recent years. Section III discusses the importance of aftercare 
services to existing foreign investors. Section IV will detail Korea‟s initiatives regarding 
regional FTA policy with a special reference to the recently concluded Korea-U.S. FTA and 
its implications on FDI policy. Section V concludes the paper with some new directional 
guidelines for Korea‟s future FDI promotion policy.  
 
II. Korea’s Recent FDI Inducement: Its Critical Role in Reviving the 
Korean Economy 
 
Korea‟s loan-based development of the past is unique compared to the development 
models of other relative latecomers. Owing to the low level of domestic savings during the 
early stage of industrialization, the Korean government maintained distinctive foreign 
investment policies, giving preference to loans over direct investment. From 1962 to 1986, 
cumulative long-term foreign capital amounted to US$49 billion. Of this amount, commercial 
loans and borrowings from development agencies represented 65 percent and 32 percent, 
respectively, of which FDI accounted for a mere 3.9 percent (Ahn, 2001a). 
 
As Table 1 and Table 2 show, Korea‟s heavy reliance on foreign borrowing to finance 
its investment requirements is in sharp contrast to Malaysia‟s dependence on FDI (Ahn, 
2001a). For example, Korea‟s inward stock of FDI as a percentage of GDP was a mere 2.1 
percent in 1990, whereas that of Malaysia and Singapore recorded 23 percent and 83 percent, 
respectively. Thus, FDI in Korea until very recently played only a marginal role in the 
country‟s rapid industrialization process. Even after Korea‟s switch to a more proactive FDI 
regime, the ratio of inward FDI stock to GDP was still one of the lowest in the world, far 
lower, in fact, than the global average or that of developing economies. 
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  Table 1: International Comparison of Inbound FDI 
(Unit:%)  
 
  
Inflow of FDI/Total Fixed 
Capital Formation  
Inward Stock of FDI as 
 a Percentage of GDP 
 2004 2005 2006 1990 2000 2006 
Developed Economies 6.6 9.3 11.8 8.2  16.4  24.2 
Developing Economies  12.9 12.6 13.8  9.6  25.6 26.7 
EU 8.1 18.2 18.1 10.5 26.0 38.0 
United Kingdom 16.1 52.9 33.9 20.6 30.4 47.8 
U.S.A. 6.2 4.9 6.8 6.8 12.8 13.5 
Netherlands 1.8 34.1 3.3 22.4 63.1 68.2 
Africa 12.6 17.8 19.6  11.7  25.5  29.5 
Asia 10.3 11.3 12.9  9.1  26.5  24.9 
Latin America 17.0 15.3 12.9  9.1  21.1  26.6 
China 8.0 8.8 8.0  5.4  17.9  11.1 
Hong Kong 96.4 90.4 103.9  58.6 269.9  405.7 
Malaysia  19.1 15.2 20.1  23.4  58.4 36.0 
South Korea  4.5 3.0 1.9  2.0  7.4 8.0 
Singapore  77.5 57.6 79.5  82.6  121.5  159.0 
Thailand  14.0 17.5 16.5  9.7  24.4 33.0 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007 
 
 
Table 2: International Comparison of Inward FDI Stock 
(Unit: US$ billion)  
Nation 1990 2000 2006 
Hong Kong 45.1 455.5 769.0 
China 20.7 193.3 292.6 
Singapore 30.5 112.6 210.0 
Brazil 37.2 103.0 221.9 
Bermuda 13.8 59.0 98.0 
South Korea 5.2 38.1 71.0 
Chile 10.1 45.8 80.7 
France 86.8 259.8 782.8 
Thailand 8.2 29.9 68.1 
Malaysia 10.3 52.7 53.6 
United kingdom 203.9 438.6 1,135.3 
Mexico 22.4 97.2 228.6 
Netherlands 68.7 243.7 451.5 
Iceland 0.15 0.5 7.5 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007 
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In recent years, particularly since the Asian financial crisis, Korea has experienced 
rather sluggish economic performance as shown in Table 5. Korea‟s average annual growth 
rate from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s was 8 percent, but declined to slightly over 4 
percent in the past 5 years. Due to a rapidly shrinking workforce coming as a result of 
population growth that ranks as the lowest among OECD member economies, low-pitched 
domestic facilities investment, and a relatively conservative ratio of FDI inflow in light of the 
increasing global trend toward decreased capital stock, Korea‟s potential growth rate had 
sharply declined from around 8 percent up until the mid-1990s to 5.1 percent in the period 
from 2000-2005. Despite the low level of domestic investment in 2006, the growth rate of 
Korea‟s outbound FDI exceeded inbound FDI during the sample period. Furthermore, the 
growth rate of capital formation in the same period was only 2.9 percent per year, dropping 
sharply from 5 percent average annual growth in the previous decade. 
 
Table 3: Annual Growth Rate of GDP, Labor, Fixed Capital Formation, 
 and FDI Inflows  
(Unit:%)  
 1987-1997 2000-2005 
Average Growth Rate of GDP 8.03 5.24 
Potential Growth Rate  8 5.1 
Growth Rate of Labor Force 1.6 0.6 
Growth Rate of Fixed Capital Formation 5 2.9 
Contribution of Domestic Investment 
 and Consumption 
8.9 3.4 
Outbound FDI (Growth rate) 35.8 7.9 
Inbound FDI (Notification growth rate) 29.0 2.8 
      Source: Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) 
 
Given this economic backdrop, raising the inflow of FDI to Korea is a matter of great 
significance in order to increase economic growth potential, achieve sustainable growth, and 
actively adjust to the age of the growing global supply chain. Even the once self-reliant Japan, 
whose focus had been solely on developing the competiveness of domestic industry, not to 
mention Southeast Asia, China, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Indonesia, has 
undertaken regulatory reform in an effort to draw foreign investment. As globalization 
becomes pervasive, thus affecting the world economy, FDI is likely to continue to play a very 
important role in Korea. 
 
 As a result, several new institutions came into being in Korea as foreign investment 
advocacy organizations immediately following the foreign exchange crisis in 1997/98. Most 
notable of these were Invest KOREA and the Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman. 
Invest KOREA is Korea‟s national investment promotion agency mandated to offer one-stop 
service as a means of attracting foreign direct investment, while the Office of the Investment 
Ombudsman was established to provide investment aftercare services to foreign-invested 
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companies in Korea. Both are affiliated with KOTRA, the Korea Trade-Investment 
Promotion Agency.  
 
As is the case with other economies competing to attract foreign direct investment, 
Korea enacted a new comprehensive foreign investment promotion act in 1998 directly 
following the onset of the Asian financial crisis to provide foreign investors lucrative 
incentives which include tax exemptions and reductions, financial support for employment 
and training, cash grants for R&D projects, and exemptions or reductions of leasing costs for 
land for factory and business operations for a specified period as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Specifically, major tax incentives eligible for high-tech and industry supporting 
businesses and companies located in Foreign Investment Zone include full exemption of 
corporate income tax for five years from the year in which the initial profit is made and 50 
percent reduction for the subsequent two years. In case of high-tech foreign investments in 
the Free Economic Zones are eligible for the full exemption three years and 50 percent for the 
following two years. Cash grants are also provided to high-tech greenfield investment and 
R&D investment subject to the government approval. 
 
Figure 1: FDI Incentive Track  
 
 
 
HIGH-TECH  
Status 
 
 
Foreign 
Investment  
Zone 
 
 
 
Cash Grant 
Qualifications Benefits Procedure 
Business within the category of 
- HIGH-TECH BUSINESS or 
- INDUSTRY SUPPORT SERVICES 
• Tax Holidays  
   ( 5yrs 100%, 2yrs 50%) 
• Lease of land in Industrial   
complex 
• Financial Support for   
  Employment & Training 
• Application to MOFS* 
• Evaluation of the Application 
• Final Decision in 20 days 
 Manufacturing 
• FDI $30M  
• New Establishment of Plant 
 
 R&D 
• HIGH-TECH Status  
• New R&D Facilities & FDI $5M 
• Over 10 R&D Personnel 
• Tax Holidays  
    ( 5yrs 100%, 2yrs 50%) 
• Lease of Land  
• Support for Basic  
Infrastructure 
• Financial Support for  
  Employment & Training 
• Documentation with Local  
   Government 
• Application to MOKE** 
• Evaluation by Foreign  
   Investment Committee 
HIGH-TECH status( or Parts & 
Material Specialty) 
 
Manufacturing  
• New Plant Facilities & FDI $10M 
 
 R&D 
•  New R&D Facilities & FDI $5M 
• Over 20 R&D Personnel 
 Granted Cash can be used for… 
• Employment & Training 
• Land Acquisition & Rent 
• Construction Cost 
• Set-up Cost for Basic   
  Infrastructure 
• Purchase of Capital Goods,  
  R&D equipment & Materials 
• Designation of Negotiation  
   Partner 
• Preliminary Negotiation   
with MOKE  
• Application to MOKE 
• Evaluation by Foreign  
  Investment Committee 
* MOFS: Ministry of Finance and Strategy   **MOKE: Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
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As a result of Korea‟s aggressive FDI inducement policy, inbound FDI notifications for 
2007 recorded US$10.5 billion. This total marked the fourth consecutive year in which 
notifications reached or exceeded the US$10 billion mark. It should be pointed out that the 
volume of arrived FDI for 2006 totaled just over US$9 billion, a slight decrease from the 
previous year but on par with a three-year annual average of US$9.2 billion as shown in 
Table 4. Also of note is that total arrived FDI over the three-year period from 2004-2006 was 
far greater than the total from 2001-2003. As Korea‟s inbound FDI increases, particularly 
during the decade since the Asian financial crisis, the country‟s outbound FDI has also risen 
sharply as Korean companies take advantage of rapid globalization and subsequent supply 
chain expansion. 
 
Table 4: Korea’s Overall Inbound FDI Trends 
(Unit: US$ million, %)  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Inbound FDI 
Notifications 
(Rate of increase) 
11,286 
(26.0) 
9,093 
(19.4) 
6,471 
(28.8) 
12,792 
(97.7) 
11,563 
(9.6) 
11,233 
(2.9) 
10,509 
(6.5) 
Inbound FDI 
Arrivals 
(Rate of increase) 
5,073 
(50.6) 
3,807 
(25.0) 
5,112 
(34.3) 
9,268 
(81.3) 
9,643 
(4.0) 
9,038 
(6.3) 
 5,057 
(3Q) 
Outbound FDI 5,164 3,702 4,007 5,991 6,560 10,759 20,734 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy, FDI Trends  
Note: Figures for arrived investment are tentative 
 
In the past two years, the EU has been the largest source of Korean inbound foreign 
direct investment, contributing more than 40 percent of total arrived FDI, followed by the 
U.S. and Japan. In 2006, greenfield investment was up 10 percent to US$6.9 billion. On an 
individual country basis, the U.S. has been the largest provider of FDI to Korea as shown in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5: Korea’s Inward FDI by Country of Origin 
(Unit: US$ thousand, %)  
Nation Number of Firms 
Inward Stock 
as of July 1, 2007 
Ratio 
USA 2,392 12,886,625 19.0 
Japan 3,012 12,414,665 18.3 
EU 1,691 29,332,456 43.2 
 
Germany 448 4,225,606 6.2 
United Kingdom 306 6,474,331 9.5 
France 206 3,199,949 4.7 
Belgium 56 2,714,287 4.0 
Netherlands 387 8,920,170 13.1 
Ireland 84 1,178,012 1.7 
Sweden 67 941,725 1.4 
Hungary 8 305,074 0.4 
Slovakia 1 54 0 
Other European 
nations 
284 1,373,250 2.0 
Other nations 6,455 13,264,399 19.5 
Total 13,550 67,898,144 100 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy, FDI Trends 
 
By industry sector, FDI inflows for manufacturing in 2006 accounted for 37.8 percent of 
total notified FDI, mainly in the electronics and chemicals sectors. The service sector 
accounted for 60 percent of that number. Manufacturing-focused greenfield investment was 
up in 2006 with large scale investment in LCDs, the chemical industry, health and sanitation. 
In the same year, despite a major upturn in mergers and acquisitions globally, M&A 
investment was down 20 percent compared with the previous year (Table 6). M&As 
occurring in the service industry were down 33.7 percent year-on-year in 2006 with M&A 
FDI recorded at just US$2.8 billion. Mergers and acquisitions in the manufacturing sector, 
however, jumped 18.7 percent to US$1.3 billion. 
 
Table 6: Inward FDI to Korea by Investment Type 
(Unit: Million, %) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
M&A 
Cases 297 285 288 339 371 363 344 
Value 
2,649 
(23.5) 
2,084 
(22.9) 
2,943 
(45.5) 
6,169 
(48.2) 
5,268 
(45.6) 
4,305 
(38.3) 
2,481 
(23.6) 
Greenfield 
Cases 3,046 2,125 2,280 2,737 3,298 2,745 3215 
Value 
8,637 
(76.5) 
7,009 
(77.1) 
3,528 
(54.5) 
6,625 
(51.8) 
6,295 
(54.4) 
6,927 
(61.7) 
8029 
(76.4) 
Total 
Cases 3,343 2,410 2,568 3,076 3,669 3,108 3559 
Value 11,286 9,093 6,471 12,794 11563 11,232 10.509 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy, FDI Trends 
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate the relative percentage of the total. 
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Table 7 shows a dramatic surge in Korean outbound FDI in 2007, surpassing a record 
US$10 billion. Of Korea‟s outbound FDI, Asia took the lion‟s share with 60 percent. China 
has proven the most favored destination among Korean investors wishing to take advantage 
of the country‟s close proximity and its status as the world‟s most populous and rapidly 
growing market. It should be pointed out that 2007 marked the first year that outbound FDI 
exceeded inbound FDI. 
 
Table 7: Korea’s Outbound FDI by Region 
                                                                     (Unit: US$ mi1lion) 
 
1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Region Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value 
Asia 1,045 1,703 1,186 1,576 2,990 3,932 3,472 6,059 3,966 11,000 
North America 139 549 714 1,420 1,099 1,277 1,334 2,142 1,331 3,557 
Latin America 31 122 51 1,505 45 307 60 527 86 1,201 
Africa 7 42 7 156 19 113 20 214 38 239 
Middle East 1 32 4 30 16 130 34 391 97 194 
Europe 71 613 67 291 140 645 166 1,195 278 4,027 
Oceania 38 39 53 90 80 153 99 202 107 513 
Total 1,332 3,102 2,082 5,069 4,389 6,557 5,185 10,731 5,903 20,734 
Source: Export-Import Bank, Korea, Foreign Investment Statistics Data File 
 
      In contrast to the very low levels of FDI even after Korea‟s drastic adjustments to its 
FDI policy regime, the inflow of foreign portfolio investment has been remarkable as seen in 
Table 8. A key strategy for corporate restructuring as a follow up to the IMF conditionality 
following the financial crisis in 1997/8 was a substantial conversion of debt to equity, which 
required a change in domestic capital market and a shift in household savings patterns as 
improvements have had to be made in the corporate financial market structure in order for 
corporations to raise necessary funds directly (Ahn, 2001b). As a result, the Korean 
government lifted the daily transaction ceilings of foreign investors in Korea‟s stock market 
in order to encourage the inflow of foreign portfolio investment. Korea‟s bourse is the most 
open among Asian countries and on par with those in the most open western economies. 
Consequently, in terms of foreign presence, there exists a substantial asymmetry between 
portfolio investment and FDI, respectively. 
 
Table 8: Foreign Share of Aggregate Market Value of Listed Stock in Korea 
 1992-2006  
(Unit: %) 
Year 1992 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Foreign Share  4.9 11.9 30.1 30.1 36.62 36.01 40.11 41.97 39.73 37.26 
Source: Korea Stock Exchange  
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III. The Importance of Aftercare Services to Existing Foreign 
Investors 
 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) pointed out the 
need for individual economies to pay keen attention to the problems faced by transnational 
enterprises and work to effectively address their grievances. Foreign investors in Korea have 
already registered a wide range of difficulties in the areas of taxation, labor-management, 
accounting, construction, technology standards, law, and lack of knowledge regarding how to 
take advantage of various available incentives. As a result, UNCTAD has placed greater 
emphasis on global investment aftercare and related advocacy measures. By improving the 
investment environment for existing investors, it would be a very effective way of improving 
international investor relations.
2
 
 
Of the average US$10 billion in FDI that Korea has been able to attract for the past 
four years, the ratio of re-investment made by established investors accounted for nearly 60 
percent of this total. This trend suggests that the need to place emphasis on post investment 
care for those investors becomes increasingly important (Figure 1). Discussions on aftercare 
service provisions warrant the nature of complaints filed by foreign investors, the grievance 
resolution process, and resolution outcomes at the Office of Foreign Investment Ombudsman. 
 
Figure 2: Trends of New Investment by Newly-Entered Foreign Companies  
and Reinvestment by Existing Foreign Companies 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
 
 
                                                          
2
 UNCTAD awarded KOTRA the 2006 World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) trophy 
for excellence for the establishment of the Office of the Investment Ombudsman system which labors on behalf 
of subsidiaries of transnational companies in Korea and the Office‟s performance in garnering increased 
investment from existing investors.  
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A Variety of Grievances 
 
Table 9 shows that foreign companies in Korea have registered a variety of grievances 
from 2001-2006, and subsequently demanded timely and effective aftercare services. In 2006, 
tax-related complaints accounted for the largest proportion and showed the sharpest increase 
of any type of grievance compared to previous years. In the past, the most frequently 
registered complaints, those related to labor-management relations, have now relatively 
declined. This is largely attributed to improvements made to stabilize Korea‟s labor-
management culture. Changes made to the FDI system and a reduction of incentives 
consequently resulted in a rise in customs and trade, investment incentive, and procedure-
related grievances. The number of tax and tariff-related grievances rose by 24.6 percent, 
while customs and trade-related grievances increased sharply by 76 percent. Those relating to 
investment incentives rose 20.0 percent during the six-year period from 2001-2006. Though 
the ratio on the whole was relatively low, what is particularly noteworthy is a 150-percent 
increase in environment-related grievances from 4 to 10 cases. Though we foresee a 
tightening of regulations in this area, more preemptive measures do need to be taken. 
 
Table 9: Annual Grievance Registrations by Type 
 (Unit: case, %) 
Year  
 
Field 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
2007 Rate of 
Increase 
2006~7 (%) Cases Ratio(%) 
Tax & Tariffs 49 67 63 64 61 76 63 16.98 △17.1 
Labor Management 63 106 93 75 42 38 24 6.47 △36.8 
Investment Process 20 51 34 22 31 27 36 9.70 33.3 
Customs & Trade 74 62 41 25 25 44 35 9.43 △20.5 
Investment Incentives 1  1 3 25 30 42 11.32 40.0 
Finance & Foreign Exchange 37 32 24 23 25 21 25 6.74 19.05 
Visa & Immigration 15 20 17 19 20 21 21 5.66 0.0 
Construction 52 43 34 35 19 16 22 5.93 37.50 
Operations & Distribution 18 14 8 13 17 5 13 3.50 160.0 
Plant Location 2 1 1 4 16 13 15 4.04 15.4 
Private Disputes 6 6 4 1 11 5 10 2.70 100.0 
Certification Examination 8 3 5 1 9 8 10 2.70 25.0 
Insurance & Public Welfare 7 9 3 5 6 2 3 0.81 50.0 
Environment 13 12 7 6 4 10 2 0.54 △80.0 
Highway & Transportation 2   1 4 1 3 0.81 200.0 
Living Conditions 15 6 2 7 3 2 2 0.54 0.0 
Power Sources 7 1 3 2 2 1 0 0.00 △100.0 
Other  39 42 29 18 31 33 45 12.13 36.36 
Total 428 475 369 324 351 353 371 100 5.00 
Source : Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman. 
 
Labor-management grievances in 2002 accounted for the highest ratio with 106 cases, a 
number which fell to 38 in 2006. Aside from labor and management-related grievances, 2006 
also witnessed lower totals in investment process-related grievances, finance and foreign 
exchange grievances, and those dealing with construction and land dropping 12.9 percent, 16 
percent, and 15.8 percent, respectively. Operation and distribution complaints, private sector 
disputes, and those related to insurance and welfare also saw drastic respective drops of 70.6 
percent, 54.5 percent, 66.7 percent in the number of related grievances. Again, the decrease in 
the number of complaints filed came as a result of changes implemented through regulatory 
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reform affecting permit acquisition, the streamlining of construction and land, operations and 
distribution (the authorization of discount warehouses), and plant location. As a result of the 
actions instituted to improve the investment environment for foreign multinationals, 
grievances related to living conditions, power and water have also dropped drastically． 
  
The Grievance Resolution Process 
 
The resolution process takes many forms. Generally, senior consultants, better known 
as “home doctors,” play a major role in the decision-making process. In the first stage, senior 
consultants do intake and evaluation in order to determine how a case should be processed. 
Then, they consult with representatives from relevant government agencies. After a case is 
reviewed and opinions exchanged between the home doctors and the Ombudsman, senior 
consultants submit a grievance resolution proposal through official channels. In the event that 
a case is rejected, the matter can be brought before the Foreign Investment Working 
Committee, the Regulatory Reform Committee, and/or the Office for Government Policy 
Coordination. A request for intervention can also be brought to the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy‟s Business Grievance Consulting Center. Although grievances can be submitted to 
the Foreign Investment Working Committee, the process of doing so has proved ineffective 
due to the fact that meetings are held only on a quarterly basis. When cases require swift 
resolution, since convening meeting and holding subsequent hearings may require more time, 
working through the Foreign Investment Working Committee may not be preferable for 
foreign investors. 
 
For cases in which transnational corporations filed grievances requiring systemic 
changes, regulatory reform and/or amendments to enforcement decrees, the Foreign 
Investment Ombudsman acts on their behalf, directly contacting the heads of relevant 
agencies and submitting proposals. The Foreign Investment Promotion Act dictates that 
government agencies should reply within a week once they receive a recommendation from 
the Ombudsman. Though many of the proposals submitted to the Office of the Foreign 
Investment Ombudsman are quite reasonable, government bureaucracy frequently keeps 
many cases from being resolved. Therefore, the taking of steps to strengthen the authority of 
the Ombudsman and improve the system is highly recommended.  
  
Rise in Grievance Resolution Rate in 2006   
 
Of the total number of grievances filed during the period of 1999-2007, those requiring 
systemic changes accounted for 237 cases and recorded a 41.3-percent resolution rate. 
However, 334 cases out of 625 cases have been successfully resolved through administrative 
intervention, a success rate of 59 percent. In addition, 221 cases were handled internally by 
home doctors. Cases requiring systemic changes that called for amendments to existing laws 
were relatively low in number, although it should be noted that the success ratios by systemic 
and administrative intervention have risen to above 90 percent, respectively (Table 10). 
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Table 10: Resolution of Grievances Filed by Transnational Companies 
(Unit: case, %) 
Year 
Systemic Change Administrative Intervention Total 
Cases Resolved Rate(%) Cases Resolved Rate(%) Cases Resolved Rate(%) 
1999 20   35   55   
2000 39 5 12.8 64 23 35.9 103 28 27.1 
2001 39 11 28.2 105 25 23.8 144 36 25.0 
2002 36 6 16.7 76 20 26.3 112 26 23.2 
2003 30 5 16.7 72 45 62.5 102 50 49.0 
2004 23 10 43.5 72 42 58.3 95 52 54.7 
2005 19 11 57.9 68 55 80.9 87 66 75.9 
2006 19 12 63.2 73 66 90.4 92 78 82.6 
2007 12 11 91.6 60 58 96.6 72 69 95.8 
Total ２37 71 41.3 625 334 59.3 862 405 54.2 
Source: Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman 
 
In the almost 9 years since the Ombudsman system was adopted in October 1999, 
home doctors have accumulated a wealth of insight into resolving grievances. Armed with 
this knowledge, and working closely with clients, the consultants have played a key role in 
resolving many of the grievances submitted.    
 
Since 2003, government officials dispatched to Invest KOREA have worked alongside 
Investment Aftercare Team staff, paying on-site visits to those who have filed complaints, 
looking for feasible solutions to problems, and contributing to raising the resolution rate. A 
recent increase in the amount of dispatched government agents has increased the number of 
direct channels to various government agencies, allowing for a higher rate of resolution. In 
2006, seven consultants from the Investment Aftercare Team paid visits to 482 transnational 
firms. One-hundred seventeen of these visits were to areas located outside of Seoul. They 
were accompanied by dispatched government officials on 47 trips.   
 
Appointed to office in 1999, the Foreign Investment Ombudsman recognized the 
urgent need to pay personal visits to business sites to find real solutions to the problems 
investors faced. After meeting with the heads of foreign multinationals, he usually brought 
their issues before the proper authorities which, to date, have included both high level 
government officials as well as local administrators. In order to make an accurate assessment 
of the current state of affairs in terms of the resolution of foreign investors‟ grievances, he 
also opened a door for cooperation between the Office of the Ombudsman, local autonomous 
government organizations, foreign missions to Korea, foreign chambers of commerce 
including the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM), European Union Chamber of 
Commerce Korea (EUCCK) and the Seoul Japan Club, as well as other economic 
organizations.   
 
The heightened level of cooperation occurring between the Regulatory Reform 
Committee of the Office for Government Policy Coordination and the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy as well as other agencies came as a result of the efforts of the Foreign Investment 
Ombudsman to better resolve grievances as seen in Figure 2. 
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Figure 3: Resolution Rates by Year 
 
 
 
Source: Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman 
 
IV. Korea’s Multi-Track FTA Policy 
 
While Korea has participated in multilateral negotiations, it has adopted, somewhat 
belatedly, a multi-track approach to regional trade arrangements as evidenced in Table 11. Of 
these arrangements, both the Korea-U.S. and Korea-EU FTA are the most important. A 
comprehensive FTA with the world‟s two biggest economies would lead to greater economic 
growth, consumer welfare gains, production surpluses, and job creation for both parties 
through increased trade and investment. 
 
Table 11: Korea’s Multi-track FTAs 
 
Nations Status 
Mid & Long-term 
Effectiveness 
Chile April 2004, Effectuation 
Assuming that capital 
accumulation must 
occur by both domestic  
and foreign investors 
Singapore March 2006, Effectuation 
ASEAN 10 
May 2006, Liberalized manufacturing 
Sector Service industry to be concluded 
in 2007 
EFTA (Switzerland, Norway, 
Ireland, Liechtenstein) 
September 2006, Effective 
Japan Negotiations suspended 
Canada, Mexico, India 
Aim to conclude within one-two 
years 
EU 6 rounds of negotiation completed  
USA 
Concluded on 
April 2, 2007 
Assuming that inward 
FDI will rise 
to US$23-32 billion 
over 10 years 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
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In the midst of the global economy‟s rapid globalization, successful conclusions of 
free trade agreements are likely to result in transforming Korea further into a highly 
competitive and attractive investment destination. In this regard, an FTA between the U.S. 
and Korea, which was concluded on April 2nd, 2007 just prior to expiry of U.S. President 
George Bush‟s TPA, becomes highly significant once it is ratified. After all, this is an 
agreement between the world‟s largest and 13th largest economies.3 Such an agreement 
would mark the largest ever cross-Pacific free trade deal and it will be watched closely 
around the world. 
In regard to the likely beneficial impact of the Korea-U.S. FTA on the Korean 
economy, a study by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) shows that 
incremental GDP growth via the KORUS FTA under a dynamic and capital accumulation 
scenario
4
 of a CGE model during a new equilibrium path period.
5
 
 
Table 12:  Economic Impact of the Korea-U.S. FTA 
 
 Short-term (Static effect

) Mid- to Long-term (Dynamic effect 

) 
Real GDP 0.42% (US$2.9 billion increase) 1.99% (US$13.5 billion increase) 
Welfare 0.61% (US$2.4 billion increase) 1.73% (US$6.8 billion increase) 
Trade 
Export to U.S. 12.1% (US$5.4 billion increase) 5.1% (US$7.1 billion increase) 
Import from U.S. 29.1% (US$9.6 billion increase) 39.4% (US$12.2 billion increase) 
Trade Balance US$4.2 billion decrease US$5.1 billion decrease 
Production 0.61% (KRW8.5 trillion increase) 1.94% (KRW27 trillion increase) 
Employment -0.51% (down 85,000) 0.63% (up 104,000) 
Source: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 
Note: 1. Static run is derived without the capital accumulation effect 
     2. Dynamic effect considers the capital accumulation effects arising from increased investment  
 
 However, it should be noted that a fundamental prerequisite for this additional 
growth due to the capital accumulation effects to be realized for Korea is that Korea should 
be able to enjoy additional inward FDI of US$2-2.5 billion on a yearly basis in addition to the 
present trend of annual FDI inflows of about US$10 billion. Unless this additional FDI is 
realized, all the economic benefits expected as a result of a ratified KORUS FTA could be 
substantially reduced. 
 
For these reasons regarding the potential impact of the KORUS FTA, Koreans should 
see the agreement as a critical turning point, that is, a chance to deepen the country‟s 
commitment to becoming a sophisticated, advanced, and truly open economy. The KORUS 
FTA should serve as a golden opportunity for Korea to enhance trade, labor, and IPR-related 
laws and systems to meet the level of global standard. 
                                                          
3
For a Korean perspective on geo-economic and geo-political implications of the concluded KORUS FTA, see 
Ahn (2007)   
4
 The capital accumulation effect refers to long-term positive impacts due to a virtuous cycle from market 
expansion through expanded trade, hence investment increases from domestic as well as foreign companies, and 
endogenous productivity increases.   
5
 Lee and Lee (2005) carried on subsequent estimation on the economic impacts of the KORUS FTA under an 
assumption of an inward foreign direct investment to Korea. 
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Korea is exploring strategies aimed at commercializing the nation‟s position as a 
peninsular hub nation connecting a continental economic group headed by China and Russia 
and an „ocean‟ economy group headed by Japan, the U.S. and other Pacific Rim economies, 
to remake itself as a major business hub of Northeast Asia. The success of this strategy rests 
largely on how successful the nation is in attracting new FDI and inducing reinvestment from 
already existing foreign investors by facilitating networking of finished goods, parts and 
materials, logistics, finance, local subsidiaries of transnational companies, and R&D centers. 
This will be possible if Korea manages to maximize returns from the recently concluded 
KORUS FTA as well as other free trade agreements and proactively attract FDI. It is well-
documented that FTAs normally establish rights and protection for foreign investors as 
stipulated in investor-state dispute and investment liberalization and intellectual property 
right measures contained in the KORUS FTA.  
 
Whether Korea manages to maximize returns on the effects of the KORUS FTA and 
subsequent multi-track free trade deals will depend largely on how actively quality FDI is 
attracted. Korea needs to carry out a number of tasks to create a foreign investor-friendly 
business environment as Korea moves forward to becoming an FTA hub nation as envisioned 
in the Korea‟s multi-track FTA roadmap. Of course, Korea should prepare itself to take full 
advantage of the potential benefits of the KORUS FTA. This begs the question as to which 
tasks must Korea face before achieving that objective. 
 
V. FDI-Friendly Regime of the New Government: Actions and 
Challenges 
 
On February 25, 2008, Korea launched a pragmatic government with President Lee 
Myung-bak taking office. Unlike his predecessors, President Lee comes from a business 
background, having served as CEO of Korea‟s leading construction company during the 
heyday of industrial growth in the 1970s. During his run-up to the Presidency, Lee 
emphasized his desire to head an action-oriented administration as he had already 
demonstrated during his tenure as Mayor of Seoul. One of the top five goals by the Lee 
government is to revitalize the sagging Korean economy and further open domestic markets. 
The new government has pledged to cut taxes to spur corporate investment and will 
undertake comprehensive deregulation to encourage foreign investment with renewed 
incentives and a more business-friendly environment. Upon his inauguration, President Lee 
created the Presidential National Competitiveness Council, on which many foreign experts 
serve as members. 
 
At the first presidential meeting chaired by the President, the Council decided to 
dramatically reduce the time needed to authorize industrial parks to a maximum of six 
months, down from the current two to four years. This reduction of inefficiencies and red tape 
across government agencies will help to reduce the burden not only on private developers but 
also on startup companies. 
 
One of the central reasons for the delays in the construction process in Korea is said to 
be the lengthy environmental and cultural due diligence on proposed industrial park sites. A 
task force to shorten the due diligence process is to be formed by members of the Ministries 
of Land and Environment, respectively. In order to remove this complex web of regulations, 
the Presidential Committee is planning to put into effect both deregulation guidelines across 
related regulations together along with a “sunset clause” for existing regulations. This is one 
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example of the lengths the new government is willing to go in implementing its plan of action 
to foster a more business-friendly environment.  
 
 To complete this process, the Lee administration is likely to face a host of challenges. 
From a broad and macroeconomic perspective, above all, Koreans need to grow their 
understanding of international economics to relieve deeply instilled xenophobia, and 
specifically, their negative sentiment against foreign capital. Korea needs also to recognize 
that many foreign companies have pointed out as some of Korea‟s most serious negative 
factors the unlawful and occasionally militant labor movements in addition to the already 
comparatively high wage levels amongst Asian countries. Korea also needs to supplement its 
FDI policy to function in a liberalized global trade environment as committed to in the 
KORUS FTA and forthcoming Doha Development Agenda negotiations. 
 
Another broad set of tasks for changing the investment environment should be to 
improve the country‟s absorptive capacity for FDI. In this regard, a Rugman model (Figure 3) 
is worth noting as it harmonizes multinational firm-specific advantage (FSA) regardless of 
foreign and domestic origin
6
 and country specific advantage (CSA), thus strengthening 
domestic economic absorptive capacity in order to select and attract transnational companies 
that can significantly help Korea remain competitive in a global market place.  
 
Korea today has two-way flows of FDI and a symmetrical pattern of cross investments, 
which is typical of the mature economies in North America, Europe and Japan. The crux of 
FDI is the realization of FSAs. As Lee and Rugman (2006) suggest, Korea should realize that 
inward and outward FDI is closely related through the dynamic process of MNCs upgrading 
CSA and FSA in host countries as evidenced by globally accelerating production 
fragmentation and supply chains. The Korean government needs to design policy measures 
effective for attracting foreign MNCs with FSAs of high quality. In a nutshell, Korea should 
move from the third quadrant to the second quadrant of the Rugman model, where both FSA 
and CSA are strong in order to design new directional guidelines for future FDI policy. 
 
Figure 4: Application of Rugman’s FSA-CSA Matrix 
Firm-Specific Advantages (FSA)   
- R&D 
- Global best managerial practices 
- Technology transfer 
Weak                   Strong 
  Most desired for  
Korea‟s FDI policy 
  
                                                          
6
  In 2001 and 2004, Korea had 11 companies respectively listed among the Fortune 500. 
Strong 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
Country Specific Advantage (CSA) 
     - Location 
     - Logistics 
     - IT 
     - Skilled labor force 
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In order to improve absorptive capacity, Korea needs to upgrade its education system 
for expatriate residents‟ school-age children by expanding the number of accredited 
international schools. It is also most crucial to make English more widely used as a business 
language by making both laws and government regulations readily available in English.  
 
Korea must also increase transparency of laws and systems in relation to FDI. For 
example, the adoption of a future tax liability system, like that of the Netherlands, would be 
very effective to remove uncertainties for potential foreign investors. As UNCTAD points out, 
industrial clustering as contained in the Korea‟s business hub strategy is a highly effective 
way to attract desired and selective FDI.    
 
Making central and local government agencies‟ incentive systems more consistent to 
achieve global standards by doing away with tax and non-tax barriers, as well as considering 
how to improve communication channels between the government and transnational 
companies, is also crucial. In this regard, the central government and its agencies should take 
a more proactive approach to providing administrative services to nurture and develop 
businesses. 
 
Especially in regard to legal aspects, Korea must introduce global standards that will 
require the country to make regular revisions of laws and systems governing FDI. Much of 
the contents of the existing regulatory regime were formulated during the export-based 
industrialization process. Therefore, it is critical to shorten the time lag between the speed of 
technological progress and shortened life cycles of products and outdated existing legal 
structures.  
 
Despite geographic restrictions, the Netherlands has managed to create a desirable 
business environment that has gained acclaim as a global logistics hub. Ireland, once the 
lowest income economy in the EU, has succeeded in rising to the ranks of an advanced 
economy mainly due to aggressive inducement of FDI. Singapore is another good example of 
a nation transforming itself into a hub of high valued foreign direct investments from MNCs. 
It is clear that we are no longer in an age of mere reciprocal FDI flows between developed 
nations, but instead, one in which less developed nations have joined the struggle for a piece 
of the global FDI pie.  
 
Foreign investors in Korea file a variety of grievances regarding taxation, labor-
management relations, accounting, urban planning and development, technology standards, 
law, and requests for assistance filing for various available incentives. Korea should 
strengthen aftercare services towards already existing foreign companies so that they can 
reinvest in Korea and effectively promote Korea as an attractive investment destination.    
 
The bulk of future inflows will be in the form of M&A between developed markets, 
thus Korea should capitalize on this emerging global trend. Cross-border M&A deals are 
increasingly encountering resistance as host countries fear a threat to their managerial 
ownership and cultural identity. There are also two bills under consideration in the U.S. 
Congress which would subject foreign takeovers to more rigorous scrutiny. Even in Korea, 
there exists a legislative attempt to regulate potential foreign takeovers of key Korean 
industries. 
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Korea has a long way to go before its ratio of inward FDI stock to GDP meets the 
global average, allowing the country to become a regional business and financial hub. Any 
legislative action to regulate hostile M&As is likely to result in negative consequences. If 
necessary, Korea should approach this issue in terms of a corporate governance system or 
other indirect measures rather than direct regulation. 
 
Korea as it stands at this point in time offers several attractive points for foreign 
investors: a) the 13
th
 biggest economy in the world, b) its strategic location in the center of 
key regional markets, c) an IT power house with the leading penetration ratio of broadband 
internet system, and d) a high quality university-educated workforce and one of the world‟s 
highest advancement ratios from high school. With the Korean government‟s renewed 
determination to promote a business-friendly environment for domestic as well as foreign 
companies, Korea is certain to become a regional business center in East Asia. 
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